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INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL: A PROPOSAL
TO ERADICATE AN INTERNATIONAL MENACE
The international community is presently fighting a losing bat-
tle against an enemy that destroys entire economies, contributes to
starvation and breeds corruption.' The enemy is the illicit drug in-
dustry, which is organized, sophisticated and well-financed.2 The
industry is currently so lucrative that traffickers can afford to sink
vessels to avoid capture, allow million dollar cargoes of drugs to be
seized or destroyed and abandon expensive planes and ships after
only a single use.' Existing multilateral treaties and drug enforce-
ment programs have failed to curb the expansion of the illicit nar-
cotics industry. This problem has resulted because the present
international narcotics control system is defective in several areas.
First, the system is directed primarily at limiting and regulating the
legal drug industry.' Although effective where licit traffic is con-
cerned, control of the illicit drug industry remains inadequate. Sec-
ond, the current international control system is drastically
underfunded. Third, concrete enforcement mechanisms for the sys-
tem are lacking.' Finally, the current multilateral treaties allow for
denunciation and provide "escape clauses" for the signatories.'
These provisions permit signatories to withdraw at any time from
the present treaties. Any attempt to control the illicit drug industry
must directly address and solve these inadequacies.'
This Comment will examine the current problem of illicit drug
trafficking and its impact on the international community, illustrat-
1. International Narcotics Trafficking." Hearings Before the Permanent Subcomm. on
GovernmentalAffairs of the U.S. Senate, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1981) (statement of U.S.
Senator Roth) [hereinafter cited as Hearings]; id. at 242 (statement of F. Mullen, Acting
Administrator, Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA)). For example, a UN representative was
forced to resign and waive immunity after he was found to be involved in a heroin smuggling
ring. N.Y. Times, May 20, 1982, at B5, col. 6.
2. Hearings, supra note 1, at I (statement of U.S. Senator Roth). See also N.Y. Times,
Oct. 21, 1982, at A30, col. 5, noting that Bolivian drug trafficking is protected and controlled
by military and paramilitary forces.
3. Hearings, supra note 1, at 2. Columbian crewmen dumped 136 bales of marijuana,
worth 3.4 million dollars, into the ocean when approached by a United States Coast Guard
Cutter. N.Y. Times, July 24, 1982, at 6, col. 6.
4. See infra text accompanying note 158.
5. See infra text accompanying notes 172-74, 179-8 1.
6. See infra text accompanying notes 165-71.
7. See infra notes 129-81 and accompanying text.
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ing that the problem has reached epidemic proportions." The Com-
ment will continue with a brief overview of the drugs which are
most frequently abused and their geographic origins.9 The history
of international narcotics control will also be examined, focusing
on the evolution of a comprehensive legal system.' 0 An analysis of
the treaties regarding international narcotics control which are
presently in force will expose the weaknesses in the present control
system." In conclusion, a proposal designed to achieve a more ef-
fective system of control via the enactment of a multilateral treaty
which will both address the weaknesses of the present system and
legally bind -the international community will be presented.
I. THE INTERNATIONAL NARCOTIC PROBLEM: AN EPIDEMIC
An initial understanding of the magnitude of the international
narcotics problem is useful. It is also helpful to examine the drugs
that are commonly abused and trace their international trafficking
routes from production to consumption. An understanding of these
facts indicate an alarming increase of drug abuse throughout the
world.
A. The Scope of the Expanding Problem
A conservative estimate of the retail value of the illicit drug
trade in the United States was eight billion dollars in 1980,12 estab-
lishing the illicit drug industry as the second largest business in the
United States.'3 Over 90 percent of illicit drugs consumed in the
United States are of foreign origin.' 4 In 1980 it was estimated that
3.6 to 4.3 metric tons of heroin,' 5 40 to 48 metric tons of cocaine
hydrochloride, 6 9,000 to 14,000 metric tons of marijuana,' 7 and
8. See infra text accompanying notes 12-35.
9. See infra text accompanying notes 34-55.
10. See infra text accompanying notes 57-128.
11. See infra text accompanying notes 162-81.
12. Smith, Drug Traffic Today-Challenge and Response, 9 DRUG ENFORCEMENT 2
(1982).
13. The illicit drug industry is second only to Exxon's 1980 annual sales of 103 billion
dollars. Id.
14. U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, FEDERAL STRATEGY 1982 (1982) [hereinafter cited as FED-
ERAL STRATEGY 1982].
15. THE NATIONAL NARCOTICS INTELLIGENCE CONSUMERS COMMITTEE, NARCOTICS
INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE 3 (1982) [hereinafter cited as NIE]. A metric ton equals 2,204
pounds.
16. Id. at 6.
17. Id. at 7.
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200 metric tons of hashish, II methaqualone t9 and other dangerous
drugs20 were illegally imported into the United States. The United
States' response to this multi-billion dollar problem has been to ex-
pend a mere fifty million dollars per year for overseas enforce-
ment.21 Similar problems exist in the international context.
The situation (in Southeast Asia and South America) no longer
permits authorities there to dismiss the narcotics issue as a dis-
tinctly American problem. It has reached epidemic proportions
• . . [and] as a result, governments which once merely gave lip
service to international drug enforcement seem to be willing at
last to become seriously involved in narcotics control.2 2
Moreover, vast amounts of money obtained from illicit traf-
ficking are "laundered" throughout the world.23  Unfair competi-
tion and economic havoc are created by channeling some of this
money into supposedly legitimate businesses. 24  Businesses which
utilize this money are able to operate at a loss, which in turn has a
destructive effect on their competitors.25
Hong Kong, Switzerland, and the Cayman Islands attract
launderers of illicitly obtained money due to their status as major
international financial centers. 26 Their bank secrecy laws cloak the
movement of large sums of money. Traffickers favor Switzerland
and the Cayman Islands because of their proximity to the United
States. 27 The free currency market28 of Hong Kong is favored be-
18. Id. at 8.
19. Methaqualone is commonly known in the United States as quaalude. Id.
20. NIE, supra note 15, at 8.
21. Id
22. Hearings, supra note 1, at 13 (statement of U.S. Senator Nunn).
23. To launder money is to conceal its source. NIE, supra note 15, at 79-86. Authorities
broke up a typical laundering operation in New York. The operation laundered over 100
million dollars from illicit trafficking in drugs into legitimate businesses. The money was
funneled through a coffee importing company to various New York bank accounts. From
these accounts, the money was transferred to accounts in other states and countries, often as
bogus business loans. The money then appeared "clean" and was withdrawn by those for
whom it was laundered. Thus, the source and detection of the money was avoided and no
taxes were paid. N.Y. Times, Nov. 17, 1982, at B3, col. 6.
24. Hearings, supra note 1, at 3 (statement of U.S. Senator Roth). William von Raab,
United States Commissioner of Customs, recently attacked Florida bankers for profitting
from drug dealers by hiding their transactions. He charged that they ignore laws requiring
them to report any transaction of over $10,000. N.Y. Times, May 10, 1982, at A16, col. 6.
25. Additionally, the DEA has linked illicit drugs to terrorist groups throughout the
world. These groups finance their activities by selling illicit narcotics. See N.Y. Times, Apr.
25, 1982, § I, at 29, col. 6.
26. NIE, supra note 15, at 81.
27. Id.
28. A free currency market is one where any amount of cash or gold may be brought
Vol. 14
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cause it provides a tailor-made environment for the international
drug trade.29
In addition, illicit trafficking breeds corruption by generating
enormous profits.30  For example, high ranking military and gov-
ernmental officials receive millions of dollars in bribes from drug
traffickers.3 ' Illicit narcotics traffic also encourages crime, such as
execution-style murders of entire families 32 and in one instance, the
murder of a federal judge who was to preside over a narcotics
case.33 Such criminal activity is prevalent throughout the entire
spectrum of the illicit drug industry.
The illicit drug industry also contributes to adverse agricul-
tural conditions. For example, in Bolivia and Peru, farmers moti-
vated by greater profits substitute marijuana and coca crops for
necessary staples.34 This increases the burden on already starving
populations.35
into or out of the country. See Litton, Hong Kong. A Financial Centre of the Pacfc and the
Far East, N.Z.L.J., January 1982 at 5-7.
29. Southeast Asian Drug Trade. Hearings Before the Subcomm on East Asian and Pa-
cfic Affairs ofthe Senate Comm. of Foreign Relations, 97th Cong., 2nd Sess. 19 (1982) (state-
ment of F. Mullen, DEA) [hereinafter cited as 1982 Hearings].
30. Hearings, supra note 1, at 242 (statement of F. Mullen, DEA).
31. N.Y. Times, Nov. 9, 1982, at A8, col. 4. Four high ranking Cuban officials, includ-
ing the chief of the Cuban Navy, were indicted on narcotics smuggling charges. They al-
lowed for the protection and resupply of ships transporting methaqualone tablets and
marijuana from Colombia to the United States. N.Y. Times, Nov. 6, 1982, at I, col. 1.
32. A Colombian couple and their two children were slain execution style in Queens,
New York. Fifteen million dollars worth of cocaine, one million dollars in cash and an
arsenal of weapons and ammunition were found in their apartment. The killings were tied to
cocaine trafficking from Colombia. N.Y. Times, Feb. i, 1982, at B 1, col. 6. Two days later,
two more people were executed in Queens as a result of involvement with the same Colom-
bian cocaine trafficking. John J. Sanntucci, Queens District Attorney, summarized the situa-
tion as follows: "There is a cocaine warfare taking place. There are terrorist-like attacks,
ambushes, kidnappings, raids on peoples' apartments and homes. It has all the earmarks of
guerrilla warfare among dealers. They are fighting for huge profits." N.Y. Times, Feb. 3,
1982, at B3, col. 5.
33. A narcotics smuggler accused of importing cocaine and marijuana murdered the
Federal judge who was to preside over his case. The suspected reason for the murder was
that the judge was known to impose stiff penalities for drug trafficking. William Webster,
Director of the FBI noted that "the large sums of money available to those who deal in
narcotics has generated a kind of arrogance that makes them willing to take on the institu-
tions that try them." N.Y. Times, Jan. 16, 1982, at B7, col. 1.
A subsequent murder was prevented by authorities when they indicted several persons
for hiring two killers to murder a judge who had sentenced their father to twenty years on
narcotics charges. Other targets of this plot were the District Attorney involved and several
Drug Enforcement Administration agents. N.Y Times, Oct. 9, 1982, at 26, col. 1.
34. Hearings, supra note 1, at 242 (statement of F. Mullen, DEA).
35. See N.Y. Times, July 31, 1982, at 26, col. 1.
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B. Abused Drugs and their Origins
Heroin abuse is the most serious international drug problem.36
The two major world production centers, the Golden Triangle37
and the Golden Crescent, 38 produce alarming amounts of the
opium poppy which is used to make heroin.39 The Golden Triangle
traffics to the United States and Europe, as well as to its own do-
mestic users.40 Much of the opium produced in the Golden Cres-
cent is consumed domestically,4' where opium and heroin abuse
have reached unprecedented levels.42
Along with heroin, cocaine abuse is increasing worldwide at a
rapid pace. The growth rate of cocaine use in recent years is unpar-
alleled by any other drug.43 Bolivia and Peru are the principle
36. The reasons for this are that heroin produces a strong physical dependence, which is
easily acquired. The drug is extremely potent and, if too pure, will cause an overdose. An
overdose frequently results in death. Address by John Warner, National Drugs Conference
in Preston England (Mar. 24-26, 1981).
Heroin is responsible for most of the overdose deaths that occur in the United States.
See WHITE HOUSE DRUG ABUSE POLICY OFFICE, FEDERAL STRATEGY FOR THE PREVEN-
TION OF DRUG ABUSE AND DRUG TRAFFICKING 1982 15 (1982).
37. The Golden Triangle consists of Burma, Laos and Thailand. The principle produc-
tion areas are along their adjoining borders. NIE, supra note 15, at 29.
38. The Golden Cresent consists of Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan. Id.
39. The opium is sold to a merchant by the farmer. The merchant sells the opium to a
morphine base processor, who sells this "base" to a laboratory. Emerging from the labora-
tory as pure heroin, the drug eventually finds its way to the user via a conglomerate of
traffickers. The farmer is paid between $350.00 and $1,000.00 for 10 kilograms of raw
opium. That opium produces one kilogram of heroin, which is sold to users for $2.23 mil-
lion. See NIE, supra note 15, at 30, 32. In 1980, Burma produced about 170 metric tons of
raw opium, Laos about 40 metric tons, and Thailand about 15 metric tons. This output of
225 metric tons from the Golden Triangle is well below its usual 500 metric ton average.
NIE, supra note 15, at 30, 32.
In 1980, Pakistan produced about 125 metric tons of raw opium, down from the 1979
production level of 800 metric tons. This decrease was due to poor growing conditions, de-
pressed prices, and governmental intervention. Id. at 22.
No accurate estimate is possible from Afghanistan due to the invasion by the Soviet
Union. However, based on previous estimates, its production level could be as high as 200
metric tons annually. Iran, equally difficult to estimate, is thought to have produced between
400 and 600 metric tons in 1980. Id. at 24.
40. NIE, supra note 15, at 32. About 70 percent of the Golden Triangle is controlled by
the Shaw United Army. While their location and activities are known, little can be done
since they are heavily armed and fortified. U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, International Narcotic
Control Strategy 2 (1981); see also, N.Y. Times, Jan. 25, 1982, at A5, col. 5.
41. NIE, supra note 15, at 24, 25.
42. Id. at 25.
43. NIE, supra note 15, at 49. One gram of street pure cocaine (12-20 percent purity)
costs the user about $120.00. Id. at 46. The coca leaf is processed into coca paste. (Approxi-
mately 350 kilograms of coca leaves yields about 2.5 kilograms of coca paste.) The paste is
then sold to produce a cocaine base which is transformed into cocaine hydrochloride. This is
buffered or "cut" to a 10 to 20 percent purity and sold to the user. The farmer receives
Vol. 14
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world sources for coca leaves which are processed into cocaine."4
Columbia is the world's primary coca processing country.45
Columbia is also the world's largest supplier of marijuana.46
Estimates placed Columbia's 1980 marijuana crop at a staggering
40,000 metric tons, 47 which far exceeded the international de-
mand.48 Marijuana is the most commonly abused drug in the
United States,49 and approximately 75 percent of the marijuana
consumed in the United States is imported from Columbia."
Mexico, in conjunction with Columbia, is a major producer
and smuggler of methaqualone5 1 Methaqualone is the most widely
used depressant on the United States market and is rapidly increas-
ing in world popularity. 2 Mexico is also a major producer of mari-
juana53 and heroin. 4 Moreover, it is an important transshipment
point for other drugs.5
In addition to heroin, cocaine, marijuana, and methaqualone,
other dangerous drugs are being abused throughout the world. 6
approximately $6,600 for 350 kilograms of coca leaves. This produces one kilogram of
"street" cocaine (i.e. cocaine hydrochloride) for which the pusher receives about $800,000.
The profit, therefore, from the farm to the street is enormous. NIE, supra note 15, at 46-47.
44. At optimum production levels, Bolivia and Peru can make available to the world
market 63 metric tons of cocaine hydrochloride annually. Id.
45. FEDERAL STRATEGY 1982, supra note 14, at 14.
46. The production of marijuana is quite simple. It is grown, dried, and then packaged.
Little processing is needed, although some hybrid types, such as "sinsemilla" require more
elaborate methods of planting and care. See NIE, supra note 15, at 56. The grower may sell
to a broker, who sells to an exporter. The exporter will sell to a foreign importer, who sells
the marijuana to a distributor. The distributor sells to a retailer, who sells to the user. Id.
The grower's price ranges anywhere from $3.00 per pound for "Colombian" to $1,800.00 per
pound for sinsemilla. The retailer, in turn, receives from $575.00 per pound for sinsemilla.
1d. The approximate str!et value-the cost to the user --- of one etric ton of marijuana is
$1.6 million. Hearings, supra note 1, at 200. (statement of Linneman, INM).
47. NIE, supra note 15, at 54.
48. Id. at 7.
49. FEDERAL STRATEGY 1982, supra note 14, at 10. An estimated 25 million Americans
use marijuana at least once a month. See NIE supra note 15, at 7.
50. NIE, supra note 15, at 54. The United States imports 93 percent of its annual supply
of marijuana. FEDERAL STRATEGY 1982, supra note 14, at 12.
51. NIE, supra note 15, at 36.
52. Id. at 63. Methaqualone is commonly known as Mandrax in Europe and Quaalude
in the United States. The drug is manufactured in a laboratory using various chemicals. It
has limited medical uses, but most of the quantity of methaqualone is produced on the illicit
market. There, bulk powder is manufactured into counterfeit tablets. FEDERAL STRATEGY
1982, supra note 14, at 12.
53. In 1980, Mexico produced an estimated 1,300 metric tons of marijuana. NIE, supra
note 15, at 36.
54. In 1980, Mexico produced approxmately one metric ton of heroin. Id. at 54.
55. Id. at 36.
56. For example, Hashish, a derivative of the cannabis plant, had a worldwide export
1984
6
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 14, No. 3 [], Art. 7
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol14/iss3/7
CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
The magnitude of the drug problem has reached epidemic propor-
tions and in response, the international community has attempted
to develop an effective system to control narcotics. An examination
of the history of international narcotics control will illustrate the
evolution of this system.
II. HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL
Several shortcomings are evidenced in the history of interna-
tional narcotics control. The current control system remains inade-
quate due to the inclusion of outdated provisions.
A. Early Attempts to Control Opium
Prior to the 16th century, the use of opium for medicinal and
ritualistic purposes was socially acceptable. 7 The first substantial
illicit trafficking began with the colonial and imperial expansion by
the European powers in the 16th century. 8 During this period, the
legal trade of opium flourished. Since it was socially acceptable,
the need for limitations on trade and trafficking was not envis-
aged. 9 By the end of the 17th century, however, opium abuse
6
1
had become widespread in almost every part of the world.6' Even-
tually, unorganized protests against illicit opium use began, and by
the end of the 19th century the tide of public opinion had
changed. 62 By the turn of the century, opium smoking had become
morally disfavored throughout the international community63 and
opium abuse had become recognized as an obvious worldwide
volume of 970 metric tons in 1980. Id. at 60. Hallucinogens such as LSD and PCP continue
to be abused. The use of stimulants such as amphetamines and methamphetamines has
doubled since 1975. FEDERAL STRATEGY 1982, supra note 14, at 18. Barbituates and tran-
quilizers are also frequently abused. These drugs are particularly dangerous because of the
numerous instances of fatal overdoses. Id. at 17.
57. S. CHATTERJEE, LEGAL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL DRUG CONTROL 3 (1981)
[hereinafter cited as CHATTERJEE]. The medicinal and ritualistic use of the opium poppy
dates back to at least 2000 B.C. There is archeological evidence that the use of opium for
such purposes was widely accepted during that period. This attitude prevailed until the 16th
century because no problem was perceived. Id. at 4-I1.
58. Glatt, The Development of International Control of Drugs, 25 WHO CHRONICLE 24,
189 (May 1970).
59. Id
60. The major form of abuse during this time was the smoking of the opium. See
CHATTERJEE, supra note 57, at 12-13.
61. Id.
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problem.64 The magnitude of the dilemma made it apparent that a
purely national solution was impossible.
65
In response, the Shanghai Commission convened with the ob-
jective of limiting the use of opium and its derivatives to medical
and scientific consumption.6 While no treaty entered into force,
the conference promulgated nine resolutions which evidenced in-
ternational concern over the increasing drug problem. 67 This con-
cern eventually led to the Hague Convention.68
The Hague International Opium Convention of 1912 69 was
the first attempt at international narcotics control which legally ob-
ligated governments by treaty.70 The Hague Convention became
the foundation of subsequent international control efforts, but un-
fortunately lacked the administrative machinery to be effective. 7
The parties, for instance, were not legally bound by certain provi-
sions, but were merely encouraged to "use their best endeavours to
comply with the provisions. 72 Signatories could therefore refuse
to comply. In addition, the Hague Convention provided that any
party could denounce the treaty at any time.73 It was believed that
such a clause was necessary to encourage ratification of the treaty
64. UNITED NATIONS DIVISION OF NARCOTIC DRUGS, 50 YEARS OF INTERNATIONAL
CONTROL 2 (March, April, 1979) (information letter) [herinafter cited as DND].
65. Id.
66. H. Wright, The International Opium Commission, 3 AM. J. INT'L L. 648-673 (1909).
67. Id.
68. CHATTERJEE, supra note 57, at 39; DND, supra note 64, at 1.
69. Hague International Opium Convention of 1912, Jan. 23, 1912, T.S. No. 612, 8
L.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter cited as Hague Convention].
70. M. BASSIOUNI & V. NANDA, TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 539
(1973) [hereinafter cited as BASSIOUNI]. Twelve nations--Germany. United States, China,
France, United Kingdom, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Persia, Portugal, Russia, and
Siam-participated in considering an attempt to curb the abuse of opium and its derivatives.
The purpose of the treaty is expressed in Article i. The States "shall enact effective laws
or regulations for the control of the production and distribution of raw opium." Id. The
treaty enumerated four basic principles: I) the production and distribution of raw opium
shall be legally controlled; 2) opium smoking should be gradually suppressed; 3) manufac-
ture, sale and use of morphine and cocaine should be limited to medical and legitimate
needs; and 4) manufacturers and traders in such drugs should be subjected to a system of
permits and recordings. Waddell, International Narcotics Control, 64 AM. J. INT'L L. 310,
312 (1970).
71. See, e.g., Recent Treaties and Statutes, Drug Control-ProtocolAmending Single Con-
vention on Narcotic Drugs, 1981 Protocol Strengthens Authority of the International Narcotics
Control Board, 6 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 624 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Drug Contro]
72. E.g., Hague Convention, supra note 69, art. 12: Due regards being had [sic] to the
differences in their conditions, the contracting parties shall use their best endeavors to restrict
to authorized persons the import of morphine, cocaine, and their respective salts.
73. Id. art. 25. If one of the contracting powers should wish to denounce the present
convention, the denunciation shall be notified in writing to the government of the Nether-
8
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by allowing States to protect their own interests. 74 In reality, the
denunciation provision had an adverse impact upon the treaty. Al-
though it attracted signatories, the provision encouraged non-
cooperation.75
Thus, the attitude of the Parties76 and the manner in which the
treaty was drafted7 7 rendered the Hague Convention ineffective.
The legal manufacture of narcotics far exceeded required needs of
the international medical and scientific community.78  With no ef-
fective means of control, drug production continued unchecked un-
til the League of Nations intervened.
B. Control Under the League of Nations
In response to the inadequacies of the Hague Convention, the
Geneva International Opium Convention was adopted in 1925.79
This was the first attempt by the League of Nations to control the
abuse of, and trade in a variety of narcotic substances. 80 States
hoped that the production and manufacture of narcotic substances
could be limited by exercising tighter control over international
trade.8t
lands, who will immediately communicate a certified copy of the notification to all the other
powers, informing them of the date it was received.
74. When the requirements of a convention are made optional, the party's sovereignty is
protected. Professor Frankel has observed that State interaction is based upon a basic con-
tradiction between the demands of sovereignty and State needs which can be satisfied only
by interaction limiting this sovereignty, sometimes to the point of demanding for the greatest
efficiency some form of super-national organization which would take decisions binding the
State. Traditionally, this dilemma was solved in the favor of State sovereignty. J. FRANKEL,
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: CONFLICT AND HARMONY 236 (2d ed. 1973). To depart from
this tradition, it is necessary to develop the habit of cooperation by means of joint efforts
through international instruments and organization. Id. at 237.
75. CHATTERJEE, supra note 57, at 189. During this period the contracting Parties suf-
fered from a lack of mutual trust and international responsibility. This, combined with the
parties' desire to guard their own interests, caused two additional conferences to be convened
to expedite ratification. See Drug Control, supra note 71.
76. See supra note 75.
77. See supra note 73.
78. DND, supra note 64, at 2.
79. Geneva International Opium Convention, Feb. 19, 1925, 81 L.N.T.S. 317 [hereinaf-
ter cited as Opium Convention]. The Convention met to bring about "a more effective limi-
tation of the production and manufacture of [narcotic] substances." This convention
adopted the Agreement Concerning Suppression of International Trade into Use of Prepared
Opium Feb. 11, 1925, 51 L.N.T.S. 337, which had convened to take action against opium
smoking, manufacture of, trade in, and smuggling of prepared opium. See also Waddell,
supra note 70, at 312.
80. CHATTERJEE, supra note 57, at 119. The Hague Convention was aimed only at
opium and its derivatives.
81. Waddell, supra note 70, at 312. The parties were required to submit annual statistics
Vol. 14
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One of the objectives of the Opium Convention was to provide
the administrative machinery that the Hague Convention lacked.
82
To accomplish this aim, the language used in the treaty provisions
was strengthened. Under the Opium Convention, it was agreed
that the Parties shall require that specific acts be done8 3 and that
definite measures be taken to control international narcotics.84 The
Permanent Central Board was created to supervise these provisions
on an international level.85 The Boards creation was significant be-
cause it evidenced the international community's recognition of the
need for an international enforcement body. Unfortunately, the
Board lacked any real power and therefore could not provide ade-
quate international supervision.
86
Despite these weaknesses, two important legal achievements
resulted from the Opium Convention. First, it divided the narcotics
control structure into two components--domestic and interna-
tional.87 Second, it legally distinguished between the manufacture
of drugs for medicinal and non-medicinal purposes. 88 The former
accomplishment was important because both domestic and interna-
tional controls are crucial to an effective system.89 Domestic con-
to the Permanent Central Board concerning the manufacture, consumption and on-hand
stocks of opium and coca leaves. Under Article 22 of the Opium Convention, quarterly
reports on the importation and exportation of these two substances were to be included in the
annual statistics. Further, Article 5 of the Opium Convention called for complete coopera-
tion between signatories and for the enactment of laws to limit substances to medical and
scientific purposes.
Opposition to this estimate system arose because it was believed that if the legal trade
was controlled, then illicit manufacture and trafficking would be stimulated. Report of the
Opium Advisory Committee, Annex 1,380, LEAGUE OF NATIONS Doc. C.760 M.260 1924 XI
(1924). This fear was later realized and is now one of the sources of the international prob-
lem. See infra note 204.
82. See supra note 61.
83. Eg., Opium Convention, supra note 79, art. 12: "Each contracting Party shall re-
quire..." this was intended to be more demanding than the language of the Hague Con-
vention. See also supra note 70.
84. Opium Convention, supra note 79. Articles 2, 3, 5, 6, and 7 called for more definite
measures of control than those of the Hague Convention.
85. Id. ch. vi, arts. 19-27.
86. Id. Article 24 gives the Permanent Central Board power to "call to the attention of
the Governments of all the Contracting Parties and of the Council of the League of Adap-
tions" any matter the Board deems questionable. The most extreme power the Board has is
that it can publish a report and forward it to the governments and the League. Id art. 24 (5).
Thus, the Board had no real enforcement powers.
87. Opium Convention, supra note 79. Chapters 1I and III of the Convention specifi-
cally enumerate provisions for internal control, while Chapter V provides for control of in-
ternational trade.
88. DND, supra note 64, at 2.
89. The Hague Convention recognized the need of domestic control in Articles 1, 2, 9,
10
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trol is necessary to regulate the production of raw opium, coca
leaves, and manufactured drugs. International control is necessary
to control trade. The distinction between manufacture for medici-
nal purposes and manufacture for other purposes was important
because by the 1920's the majority of the illicit narcotics supply was
derived from legal trade.90 This distinction was accomplished by
utilizing an estimate system9' which provided that all narcotics not
covered by the system were deemed to be used for abuse
purposes.
92
The Opium Convention, however, had little effect because ap-
plication of the estimate system was not compulsory. 93 Moreover,
some important narcotics producing countries did not sign the
treaty,94 and thus it lacked any "universal" commitment. Further,
the Convention possessed no adequate provisions for international
supervision.95 As a result, drug trafficking and addiction continued
to spread throughout the world.
Instigated by an alarmed public, a third convention was signed
at Geneva in 1931.96 The premise underlying the 1931 Convention
was both new and extremely useful to later treaties.97 The new
treaty was based on the premise that if the supply of drugs becomes
limited, then illicit trafficking necessarily becomes limited as well.98
10 and 11. The Opium Convention strengthened these and provided more definite measures
of control. Id arts. 2, 3, 5, 6 and 7. For example, the Opium Convention provided that
export and import of coca leaves could be limited to a certain number of towns, ports or
other places. See Opium Convention, supra note 79, art. 2. The Hague Convention had no
such provisions.
90. At least 100 tons of opium derivatives entered into illicit traffic between 1925 and
1929. The world's licit demand during this period was only 39 tons. The excess production
found its way into illicit channels. Today there is no significant diversion of narcotics from
licit manufacturers to illicit traffic. DND, supra note 64, at 2.
91. See supra note 81.
92. DND, supra note 64, at 2.
93. Opium Convention, supra note 79, art. 18.
94. These States were Afghanistan, Albania, China, Ethiopia, Guatemala, Iceland, Iran,
Liberia, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Saudi Arabia, and the United States.
95. See supra note 86.
96. Convention for Limiting the Manufacture and Regulating the Distribution of Nar-
cotic Drugs, July 13, 1931, 139 L.N.T.S. 301 [hereinafter cited as 1931 Convention]; Waddell,
supra note 70, at 313. The purpose of the Convention was to supplement the Hague and
Geneva Conventions by "rendering effective by international agreement the limitation of the
manufacture of narcotic drugs to the world's legitimate requirements for medical and scien-
tific purposes and by regulating their distribution."
97. The Modem United States Strategy for International Narcotics Control operates on
the premise that the most effective way to combat illicit trafficking is to control it at its
source. FEDERAL STRATEGY 1982, supra note 14, at 2.
98. CHATrERJEE, supra note 57, at 153. The 1931 Convention introduced a new esti-
Vol. 14
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The 1931 Convention was very effective in limiting and regulating
the manufacture and distribution of legitimate narcotics. It became
increasingly difficult for illicit traffickers to obtain drugs from legit-
imate factories99 which were originally their primary source."
Consequently, the illicit trafficker's use of clandestine laboratories
to produce narcotics increased.' 0 '
As these conventions were all primarily directed at legal nar-
cotics control and regulation, a new treaty was needed to fill the
void left in the industry's illicit aspects. The Convention for the
Suppression of Illicit Traffic in Dangerous Drugs was adopted in
1936 to provide this gap-filler.' 0 2 The 1936 Convention was the
first convention to directly attack illicit trafficking 0 3 and make the
offense criminally punishable." While previous treaties had asked
for mere cooperation between the parties, the 1936 Convention re-
quired States to recognize illegal trafficking as a criminal offense
and punishable as such. This mandate was not easily accom-
plished. The 1936 Convention attempted to set out stringent penal-
ties and expected States with different philosophies on criminal law
to accede to these sanctions.' 0 5 Further, the 1936 Convention in-
mate system whereby all countries, both signatories and non-signatories, were to provide
estimates of their legitimate narcotics need for the following year. By these means, the legiti-
mate worldwide need for narcotics could be determined. Thus, the manufacture and export
could be controlled to comply with those needs. The Permanent Central Opium Board was
given the power to embargo any imports that would exceed the estimates. See 1931 Conven-
tion, supra note 96, at art. 14. This power, however, was never exercised. See Waddell, supra
note 70.
99. DND, supra note 64, at 4.
100. Id.
l01. See DND, sara note 64, at 4. The 1931 Con, ention preentd an interesting at-
tempt at "international legislation," which was, up until that time, unknown to international
law. Compared with other commodity agreements, this convention achieved a higher degree
of international cooperation because its authors applied two methods which underlie all or-
ganized attempts at influencing human behavior. These were seeking the consent of those
whose cooperation will enable the execution of the rule of social behavior to be effective and
putting pressure on possible dissenters. See The Evolution of the International Control of
Narcotic Drugs, 2 BULL. NARC. 3, at 5 (July, 1950).
102. Convention for Suppression of Illicit Traffic in Dangerous Drugs, June 26, 1936, 198
L.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter cited as 1936 Convention]. This is the only pre-UN Convention
that is not expressly terminated by the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, March 30,
1961, 520 U.N.T.S. 151, T.1.A.S. 6298 [hereinafter cited as Single Convention].
103. CHATTERJEE, supra note 57, at 169.
104. 1936 Convention, supra note 103, at art. 2. The parties were to impose severe penal-
ties against traffickers notwithstanding their nationality or the situs of the crime. In effect,
the Parties were asked to apply the principle of universality in their criminal law provisions.
See Waddell, supra note 70, at 313. The Parties were also required to facilitate extradition
for drug offenses. BASSIOUNI, supra note 70, at 540.
105. CHATTERJEE, supra note 57, at 181-82. The penal provisions were at best vague.
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fringed upon the States' cherished principles of territoriality and
extradition."° For example, offenders could be punished for the
same act in different countries, as the act in each country was con-
sidered a separate offense. 107
The 1936 Convention failed to attract a significant number of
signatories 0 8 because its "get tough" principles made it unaccept-
able to many States. 10 9 Due to inadequate international support,
the 1936 Convention failed to achieve an international consensus as
to what would be considered punishable acts in narcotics traffick-
ing."' The 1936 Convention also contained provisions for denun-
ciation similar to those of the Hague Convention."'I Thus, the 1936
Convention did not provide effective deterrence against illicit traf-
ficking" 2 and the problem continued to expand.
The Second World War ended the League of Nations period.
States sought to protect their own interests and consequently the
requisite desire to adequately participate in international narcotics
control was lacking. The major accomplishment of the treaties of
the pre-war period was that they forced illicit traffickers to seek new
sources for narcotics."l 3 However, because the control scheme was
directed at the legal narcotics industry, it failed to deter the illicit
drug industry. "14
C. Control Under the United Nations
After the Second World War, the newly formed United Na-
The treaty set out acts to be punished, but it failed to specify any grade to the offense. Thus,
the Parties were given no guidelines to distinguish, for example, between preparatory acts,
attempts, simple possession and possession with intent to distribute. See 1936 Convention,
supra note 103, art. 2.
106. 1936 Convention, supra note 103, arts. 3, 4, 6, 7; Starke, The Convention of1936for
the Suppression of Illicit Traffic in Dangerous Drugs, 31 AM. J. INT'L L. 31 (1937); see also
supra note 74.
107. 1936 Convention, supra note 103, at art. 4. Thus, the offender could be subject to
double liability.
108. There were only thirty-four signatories to this treaty. See DND, supra note 64, at 8.
109. CHATTERJEE, supra note 57, at 189.
110. Id. at 183.
III. 1936 Convention, supra note 103, at art. 18, sec. 3.
112. This author and others believe that the 1936 Convention was an achievement in that
it put on the individual States the obligation to severely punish illicit traffickers in drugs.
See, e.g., Starke, supra note 107, at 38. The United States is not a signatory of the 1936
Convention. Cabranes, International Law and Control ofthe Drug Trafficking, 7 INT'L LAW.
761, 764 (1973).
113. They had to seek new sources due to the regulation of legal production. See DND,
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tions sought to continue the efforts of the League of Nations to de-
velop an effective system of narcotics control. The 1946 Geneva
Protocol" 5 was adopted to transfer institutions of the extinct
League of Nations to the corresponding institutions of the United
Nations. 16 However, the 1946 Geneva Protocol was primarily ad-
ministrative and did not affect existing treaties.
With the advancement of pharmacology and chemistry during
the post-war period many new drugs capable of producing addic-
tion were synthesized."' These drugs were mainly synthetic and
were not covered under the 1931 Convention. 1 8 In order to in-
clude drugs outside of the scope of the 1931 Convention, the 1948
Paris Protocol was enacted.' '9
The 1948 Paris Protocol met with mixed success. Many coun-
tries complied with its provisions. 20 On the other hand, the 1948
Paris Protocol evidenced a residual pre-United Nations attitude
and many States still lacked the desire to be bound by an interna-
tional instrument."'2 In addition, the 1948 Paris Protocol contained
a provision which allowed the Parties to denounce the treaty.'22
Similar to previous treaties, the purpose of this provision was to
attract signatories. 23 Moreover, the 1984 Paris Protocol was again
directed primarily at the legal aspects of the international drug
industry. 1
24
In 1953 a new protocol was signed.' 25  The most significant
115. 1946 Geneva Protocol, Dec. 11, 1946, T.I.A.S. Nos. 1617, 1859, 12 U.N.T.S. 180, 277
[hereinafter cited as 1946 Geneva Protocol].
116. Waddell, supra note 70, at 314.
117. Id.
i18. Id See 1931 Convention, supra note 96.
119. 1948 Paris Protocol, Nov. 19, 1948, 44 U.N.T.S. 277 Under the provisions of the
1948 Paris Protocol, any new drug that was discovered by chemistry or pharmacology with
the potential of addiciton was to be reported to the Secretary General of the United Nations.
See id. art. 1, § 2. If the drug was deemed potentially addictive it would be subject to the
controls of the 1931 Convention. Id.
120. CHATrERJEE, supra note 57, at 328-330.
121. To wit, the hesitancy of the Parties to accept the "territorial clause" which was
adopted by a 33 to 8 vote with 12 abstentions. Id. at 330.
122. 1948 Paris Protocol, supra note 118, art. 9.
123. See supra notes 73-75.
124. 1948 Paris Protocol, supra note 118.
125. Protocol for Limiting and Regulating the Cultivation of the Poppy Plant, the Pro-
duction of, International and Wholesale Trade in and Use of Opium, June 23, 1953, U.N.
Doc. E/N.T./8 [hereinafter cited as 1953 Protocol]. The 1953 Protocol's aim was to fill the
gaps left by earlier conventions. BASSIOUNI, supra note 70, at 541. See Bilder, Burman,
Cohen, Huang, Nilsen, Reis, Contemporary Practice ofthe United States Relating to Interna-
tional Law, 57 Am. J. INT'L L. 894, 896 (1963) for an interesting discussion as to whether the
1953 Protocol is still alive.
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aspect of the 1953 Protocol was that it sought to control the agricul-
tural production of the opium poppy. The 1953 Protocol specifi-
cally prohibited its non-medical use and limited the number of
countries which were authorized to export opium. 126 Before the
1953 Protocol entered into force, however, the Single Convention
on Narcotic Drugs was signed. 127  The Single Convention is the
foundation of the present control system.
III. THE PRESENT INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL
SYSTEM
As of 1953, there were nine major multilateral agreements re-
garding international narcotics control that were in need of simpli-
fication and codification.' 28  To accomplish this task, the Single
Convention on Narcotic Drugs was adopted 29 and replaced all ex-
isting multilateral narcotics treaties.'
30
A. The Machinery of the Present System
Each party to the Single Convention is required to provide an-
nual statistics to the International Narcotic Control Board' dis-
closing the amount of drugs produced, consumed, seized, or
stockpiled. 13 2 These amounts are compared with the estimated
medical and scientific requirements of each drug' 33 and limited ac-
126. These countries were Bulgaria, Greece, India, Iran, Turkey, USSR, and Yugoslavia.
1953 Protocol, supra note 126.
127. See Single Convention, supra note 103.
128. Id. With this objective in mind, seventy-four parties and represetatives from the
World Health Organization, the Permanent Central Opium Board, the International Police
Organization and the Drug Supervisory Board convened in New York. Waddell, supra note
70, at 316.
129. Single Convention, supra note 103. At the time of its drafting, the Single Conven-
tion had four major objectives: 1) the codification of the existing multilateral conventions on
drugs; 2) the simplification of the international control machinery; 3) the extension of the
control system to the cultivation of other natural products, in addition to opium and poppy
strains, which produce narcotic effects; and 4) the adoption of appropriate measures for the
treatment and rehabilitation of drug addicts. See CHATrERJEE, supra note 57, at 343.
130. Single Convention, supra note 103. While the Single Convention did not replace the
1936 Convention, it did incorporate similar penal divisions. These penal provisions are sub-
ject to the constitutional limitations of the Parties. Id. art. 36.
131. Id. at art. 5. The Permanent Central Opium Board and the Drug Supervisory board
were consolidated to form the International Narcotic Control Board. The Board is the en-
forcement mechanism of the Single Convention, while the Commission on Narcotic Drugs is
the policy making organ. See, e.g., Waddell, supra note 70, at 316-17.
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cordingly t34 so as not to exceed the designated requirements. 35
The Single Convention also requires the Parties to provide that the
cultivation, 136 manufacture, 37 trade, and distribution of drugs
138
be permitted only under an authorized license. Thus, strict compli-
ance with the statistical returns and licensing scheme ensures the
Parties an internal monopoly on the legal drug industry.'39
Of the fifty-one Articles contained in the Single Convention,
only two of them deal specifically with the illicit aspects of narcotic
substances. 140 Article 35 is deceptively entitled "Action Against Il-
licit Traffic." Yet, the Article simply "asks" that the parties cooper-
ate with each other to eradicate illicit drug trafficking. Article 36
"recommends" penal provisions against all offences with regard to
illicit narcotic substances. A provision in the Article states, how-
ever, that "the Party shall have the right to refuse to effect the arrest
or grant the extradition in cases where the competent authorities
consider that the offense is not sufficiently serious."' 14 1 The final
provision in Article 36 provides that "nothing contained in this Ar-
ticle shall affect the principle that the offences to which it refers
shall be defined, prosecuted, and punished in conformity with the
domestic law of a party."' 42 It is apparent from these two Articles
that the Parties may treat illicit traffickers and producers as they
wish.
In addition to the Single Convention, the present international
134. Limitation can occur in one of two ways. First, if a party exceeds its annual esti-
mate, the amount of excess is deducted from the following year's estimate. If this does not
provide an adequate limitation, an embargo may be imposed on the Party which exceeds its
estimate. See id. art. 21 (4)(a) and (b).
.35. d art. 21 . T he Single Convention classifies narcotic substances into four schedules
or groups. Article 1(1)(V) defines the schedules as a "list of drugs." Id at art. 1. Each
schedule is subject to certain provisions of the Single Convention--the more dangerous the
drug, the more control necessary. Id at art. 2.
136. Id. arts. 23, 25, 26, 28.
137. d. at art. 31.
138. Id.
139. Theoretically, all phases of opium, coca leaf and marijuana transactions can be reg-
ulated under the Single Convention. See DND, supra note 64, at 5.
140. Single Convention, supra note 103, arts. 35, 36; see also art. 37 that provides for
seizure and confiscation of illicit contraband. Article 38 provides for the treatment of drug
addicts. This provision is an important step in the international scheme since, for the first
time, addicts can be treated and rehabilitated, whereas in the past they were treated as
criminals. The more addicts that can be rehabilitated, the less demand there would be for
illicit narcotics.
141. Id art. 36(2)(b).
142. Id. art. 36(4). These provisions, then, allow a party to simply ignore the provisions
against illicit trafficking. These provisions are carried over from the previous multilateral
treaties, and severely weaken the Single Conventions' effectiveness.
16
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control system utilizes two other important treaties. These are: (1)
the Convention on Psychotropic Substances, 143 and (2) the 1972
Protocol Amending the Single Convention.'44 The Convention on
Psychotropic Substances was enacted to bring psychotropic sub-
stances 45 under international control, as well as to reduce the
abuse and illicit traffic of such drugs.' 46  The Convention on
Psychotropic Substances is modeled after the Single Convention
and utilizes the same basic mechanism. "4 The major differences
between the Convention on Psychotropic Substances and the Single
Convention is that the former does not utilize the estimate
system. 148
The Convention on Psychotropic Substances resembles the
Single Convention in that it contains almost identical provisions for
action against illicit traffic which are equally ineffective. 149  Fur-
thermore, the Convention on Psychotropic Substances also contains
a denunciation clause 1So and provides that a Party may accept the
treaty with reservations.' 5 ' Clearly these provisions significantly
reduce the import of both Conventions. 52
The other important international agreement is the 1972 Pro-
tocol Amending the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs.'5 3 The
143. Convention on Psychotropic Substances, openedfor signature Feb. 21, 1971, U.N.
Doc. E/CONF 58/7.
144. 1972 Protocol Amending the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, Mar. 25, 1972,
26 U.S.T. 1439, T.I.A.S. No. 8118 [iereinafter cited as 1972 Protocol].
145. A psychotropic substance is one that acts on the mind. The Convention is designed
to cover hallucinogens (e.g., L.S.D., phencyclidine), stimulants (e.g., amphetamines) and de-
pressants of the central nervous system (e.g., barbituates, methaqualone). DND, supra note
64, at 6.
146. CHATTERJEE, supra note 57, at 456; see BASSIOUNI, supra note 70, at 543.
147. In fact, in some places there is overlap. The Single Convention, for example, allows
psychotropic substances to be placed under its control without that substance being removed
from the schedules of the Convention on Psychotrophic Substances. See CHATTERJEE, supra
note 57, at 473-74.
148. Id The Convention on Psychotropic Substances does not use the estimate system
because psychotropic substances are widely used for medicinal purposes, and therefore were
previously not included in the international control system. Since there was no previous
experience in estimating psychotopic substances, they could not be accurately projected.
149. See supra note 143. Article 21 of the Convention on Psychotropic Substances does
not significantly differ from Article 36 of the Single Convention.
150. Convention on Psychotropic Substances, supra note 144, art. 29.
151. Id art 31.
152. See the discussion of denunciation clauses, supra notes 73-75, and infra notes 165-
168.
153. 1972 Protocol, supra note 145. The 1972 Protocol was developed to strengthen the
Single Convention. It provided for an expanded estimate system (Articles 9, 10) and pur-
portedly increased the authority of the International Narcotics Control Board to ensure com-
Vol. 14
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1972 Protocol modernized the attitude towards drug abusers, pro-
viding education, treatment, rehabilitation, and social reintegration
as alternatives to imprisonment.'54 The 1972 Protocol also pro-
vides that serious crimes are extraditable.' 55 If the Parties have no
other legal basis for extradition, the Single Convention may be in-
voked .56
The amended Single Convention and the Convention on
Psychotropic Substances comprise the current legal foundation for
international narcotics control. They effectively control the entire
legal drug spectrum, from production to consumption. As a result,
there is virtually no diversion of manufactured narcotic drugs from
the licit to the illicit market.1
5 7
The Convention on Psychotropic Substances, however, has not
been as successful as the amended Single Convention. The prob-
lem of diversion of psychotropic substances from legal to illicit traf-
fic is yet to be resolved. 58 This difficulty is due to the lack of
experience in control methods.'59 Moreover, there are only sev-
enty-six parties to the Convention on Psychotropic Substances,
whereas the Single Convention has over one-hundred and fifty
signatories. 
60
The history of international narcotics control reveals that there
is growing world concern over the narcotics epidemic. This is evi-
denced by the fact that twelve major international agreements have
been concluded in the last eighty years. These agreements, aided
by experience and refinement, have managed to control the legal
narcotics industry and provide a firm basis for the control of licit
psychotropic substances. However, these agreements fail to directly
address the immense problem of illicit drug control. Therefore, a
new system must be devised to attack this problem. The weak-
nesses of the present system must be examined and corrected by the
enactment of a multilateral treaty directed toward curtailment of
the illicit narcotics industry.
pliance with the Single Convention. See id. art. 6. It further called for increased cooperation
between the Parties such as augmentation of an informational exchange. See id art. 13.
154. Id art. 14(b).
155. Id. art. 14(2)(b)(i).
156. Id art. 14(2)(b)(ii).
157. DND, supra note 64, at 7.
158. Id.
159. See supra note 149.
160. For a list of the signatories, see U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, TREATIES IN FORCE 1982,
260-61 (1982).
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B. Weaknesses of the Present System
The present system of international narcotics control inherits
six major weaknesses from earlier multilateral treaties. These
weaknesses are: (1) inclusion of denunciation clauses (2) inclusion
of escape clauses, (3) lack of concrete enforcement mechanisms, (4)
lack of any mechanism designed to attack crop production, (5) ex-
clusive focus on the legal industry and (6) lack of funding. An ex-
amination of these deficiencies will illustrate which problems the
new multilateral treaty needs to address.
First, the aspects of illicit drug control receive little attention in
the present treaties.16' The Single Convention devotes only two of
its fifty-one articles to the illicit industry, 162 and only two of the
twenty-two articles of the 1972 Protocol are aimed at "strengthen-
ing" the Single Convention. 163 Without comprehensive multilat-
eral provisions, the Parties lack guidelines for combatting illicit
production and trafficking.
Second, the present system allows the parties to denounce any
or all of the current treaties."64 These provisions, a carry over from
previous conventions, were used to attract signatories. The effect of
these provisions is to allow the parties to hold a non-obligatory
view towards the treaties.16 5 As long as such an atmosphere exists,
a universal commitment to combat the illicit drug industry is im-
possible. 166 Thus, provisions for denunciation reduce the effective-
ness of the present conventions.
167
Third, the present conventions contain "escape clauses"'' 68
which allow a party to avoid certain provisions of a treaty. For
example, Article 36 of the Single Convention enumerates specific
acts which are to be considered punishable offenses.' 69 However,
the same Article states that the parties "shall have the right to re-
fuse arrest or grant the extradition in cases where the competent
authorities consider that the offense is not serious enough." 7 ° Fur-
161. See, e.g., Single Convention, supra note 103, art. 35; 1972 Protocol, supra note 145,
art. 13.
162. See supra note 151.
163. 1972 Protocol, supra note 145, arts. 13 and 14.
164. Eg., Single Convention, supra note 103, art. 46.
165. See supra note 73-75.
166. See CHAT-rERJEE, supra note 57, at 189, 206, and 528.
167. Id. at 493.
168. See, e.g., Single Convention. supra note 103 art. 36. Again, this weakness was a
carryover from previous treaties, hoping to attract more signatories.
169. Id. art. 36(1).
170. Id. art. 36(1).
Vol. 14
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thermore, Section 4 of Article 36 provides that the parties may de-
fine, prosecute, and punish offenses consistent with their own
domestic law. In effect, these clauses impose no binding obligation
on the parties, as they permit the entire Article to be followed or
ignored by any party at its discretion.
Fourth, the present international control system lacks any con-
crete enforcement mechanism.' The existing enforcement bodies
possess only advisory authority. Article 6 of the 1972 Protocol di-
rects the International Narcotics Control Board to alert the parties
or the General Assembly of the United Nations to any non-compli-
ance by a particular party. In extreme cases, the Board may recom-
mend an embargo of the import and export of drugs from a
particular party.'72 Neither measure is required, however, and the
Board can only recommend that the steps be taken. Thus, the
Board operates only as a pseudo-enforcement mechanism.'73
Fifth, the system directs its attack toward production at the
source (crop control). While theoretically valid, attainment of this
goal is impossible in practice. The illicit drug industry could sup-
port worldwide demand from only a few production sources.' 74 If
illicit production is reduced in one area, the shortage can be com-
pensated in another.17 5 Moreover, in some areas, crop control is
simply not feasible because crops are heavily guarded by armies
employed by the illicit producers.' 76 Unless production can be si-
multaneously reduced everywhere, the ultimate objective of the
present conventions can never be obtained.
77
Finally, existing programs are drastically underfunded. ' 78 The
Single Convention provides that parties shall contribute to the ex-
penses in such amounts that the General Assembly shall find "equi-
table and assess from time to time."' 179 There is no specified
amount to be contributed to defray the expenses of international
narcotics control, and there is no obligation placed on the parties to
171. Cabranes, supra note 113, at 765.
172. 1972 Protocol, supra note 145, art. 6(2); this measure has never been imposed. See
supra note 132.
173. Cabranes, supra note 113, at 765.
174. DND, supra note 64, at 2-3.
175. Policy Issues Related to International Narcotics Control 1982 Hearings, supra note 29
(statement of D. DiCarlo, INM).
176. Id. See also infra note 205.
177. 1982 Hearings, supra note 29 (statement of D. DiCarlo, INM).
178. See, e.g., Hearings, supra note I (statement of Linneman, INM).
179. Single Convention, supra note 103, art. 6.
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provide contributions.' 80 As a result, there is no reliable source of
income and little money is actually contributed.
IV. TOWARD A SYSTEM OF EFFECTIVE CONTROL
A universal commitment by the international community is
necessary before any successful international effort to control the
illicit drug industry can be undertaken.' 8 ' Without such a commit-
ment, the measures required to combat expansion of the illicit in-
dustry cannot be enacted and applied. Fortunately, there are
favorable indications that this climate of universal commitment ex-
ists today.
A. The Existence of Universal Commitment
It is now generally recognized that drug addiction and usage
problems in the international community have reached epidemic
proportions. 82 Internal drug problems are causing countries to
seek solutions on an international level since they cannot eradicate
the problem domestically. 83 States are now refusing to protest
prosecution of nationals who have been arrested for committing
drug offenses in foreign countries'84 and this encourages the prose-
cution of drug offenders.
l8
The international community's readiness to mobilize against
drug trafficking is also evidenced by the large number of signatories
to the existing treaties. There are more than 150 signatories to the
Single Convention. 86 International commitment is also demon-
strated by the positive steps being taken in the direction of narcotics
control. For example, the United States has enacted legislation'
87
180. Id.
181. This assumes that there exist a desire by most of the international community to
take the necessary steps to eradicate the illicit drug industry.
182. See supra notes 12-56 and accompanying text.
183. See supra note 22.
184. See, e.g., Note, "Double Jeopardy" on the High Seas. International Narcotics Traf-
fickers Beware, 10 GA. J. INT'L AND COMP. L. 647, 671 (1980).
185. Id
186. TREATIES IN FORCE 1982, supra note 161, at 170.
187. The United States has enacted the following legislation aimed at the illicit narcotics
industry: 1) legislation to allow the United States military to provide assistance to narcotics
law enforcement agencies. Amendment to the Posse Commitatus Act, 10 U.S.C. 372
(Amending 18 U.S.C. 1385); 2) legislation to allow for the herbicidal spraying of drug crops,
Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act; 3) legislation to provide criminal sanctions for
deterrence, 31 U.S.C. 1058; 4) legislation to compel financial institutions to disclose informa-
tion on illicitly obtained money, 31 U.S.C. 1081.
The United States has even proposed that its Federal judges refuse bail to certain per-
Vol. 14
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directed at narcotics control and is actively campaigning to con-
vince the international community that its objective is to minimize
the world drug problem.
88
Other indicia point to the existence of a universal commitment.
Since World War II, international economic development has be-
come a prevalent concern" 9 which has led to the development of a
cooperative international law. 190 In order to effectively deal with
important international problems, States today are expected to
compromise their sovereignty to a degree.' 9 ' To this end, Professor
Schwarzenberger notes:
Thus, to any extent to which international functional coopera-
tion requires a curtailment of sovereignty, it is assumed that, in
the interest of the task at hand, States are willing to aquiesce in a
corresponding restriction of their freedom of action . . . . [A]n
international community would be expected to approach any
critical problem in this spirit [of cooperation].'
9 2
Thus, it appears that the international community is ready to take
the necessary steps to minimize the global dilemma caused by the
illicit narcotics industry.
B. A Proposed Multilateral Treaty
It has been demonstrated that the international community is
willing to take the necessary steps to control the illicit drug indus-
try. It is therefore proposed that a multilateral treaty be enacted to
minimize the illicit drug industry by correcting weaknesses in the
present control system. The articles of the new multilateral treaty
should contain the following provisions.
First, the agreement must provide for the establishment of ed-
ucational treatment centers throughout the world, with special con-
centration in those countries that harbor major producers,
manufacturers, and abusers of narcotics. Construction of these
centers would be required of each signatory, with the location and
number of necessary centers determined by the United Nations
sons charged with drug offenses. See Hearings, supra note 1, at 14 (statement of U.S. Senator
Roth).
188. This is a major problem for the United States. Other nations believe that since the
abuse of drugs in the United States is so prevalent, it has no right to complain, until it can
control its domestic problem.
189. W. FRIEDMANN, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 11-12
(1964). See generally J. FRANKEL, supra note 74.
190. P. JESSUP, TRANSNATIONAL LAW 15-16 (1956).
191. G. SCHWARZENBEROER, POWER POLITICS 420 (1951).
192. Id.
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Commission on Narcotic Drugs. 93 The construction and mainte-
nance of these centers would be funded by both the State and the
international community through the United Nations Fund for
Drug Abuse Control (UNFDAC). 9 4 The current narcotics control
systems call for "Regional Centers,"' 95 but their establishment is at
the discretion of the individual parties. A mandatory provision is
necessary because these centers are vital to increasing the aware-
ness of the problem. These centers would serve to decrease the
number of addicts through rehabilitation, which would in turn re-
duce the demand for illicit narcotics.
96
Second, the new treaty should provide for increased monetary
input by the signatories to UNFDAC. 97 UNFDAC currently re-
ceives contributions on a voluntary basis, 198 and the new treaty
would make funding to UNFDAC mandatory. Each signatory
would be required to donate a specified amount each year, depend-
ing upon its economic status. The expansion of monetary input to
UNFDAC could also be accomplished by providing that all seized
and confiscated narcotics money, 199 including the auction of confis-
cated vessels, be turned over to UNFDAC.2 °° If adequately
funded, UNFDAC could provide a dependable source of support
for programs designed to attack the illicit narcotic industry.
Third, the new treaty should eliminate all escape clauses and
denunciation provisions. Such clauses are no longer necessary to
attract signatories.20 By eliminating such clauses and provisions,
the treaty would legally obligate the parties to enact its provisions.
This would result in a tangible universal commitment to attack the
illicit drug industry and apply pressure on the parties to take action.
193. The Commission would have access to all information pertaining to the production,
manufacture and trade in narcotic substances.
194. This is the current financial institution that provides funding to the International
Narcotics Control Board. The Board recommends the granting of technical and financial
assistance to the appropriate States. See DND, supra note 64, at 7.
195. 1972 Protocol, supra note 145, art. 16.
196. These centers would also constitute tangible evidence to the illicit drug industry that
positive steps are being taken against them. This would hopefully contribute to a deterence
against them.
197. See supra note 195.
198. Single Convention, supra note 103, art 6; FEDERAL STRATEGY 1982, supra note 14,
at 29.
199. More than $48 million was seized in currency alone in 1981. N.Y. Times, Jan. 3,
1982, at 51, col. 1.
200. Single Convention, supra note 103, art. 37. This Article allows for seizure and con-
fiscation, but does not provide where the proceeds are directed. Id.
201. See supra notes 184-193 and accompanying text.
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Fourth, the new treaty would include provisions designed to
de-emphasize crop control as a means of curbing illicit traffic. The
control of production has been unsuccessful, 20 2 as the illicit pro-
ducer simply shifts his production sights or uses synthetic substi-
tutes. In the Golden Triangle, for example, the production and
trafficking is too well protected by drug warlords. 2° s Therefore, an
alternate strategy should be devised. A United Nations force could
impose a blockade on large protected production areas.
Fifth, the new treaty should establish adequate enforcement
measures, without which no treaty can function efficiently. En-
forcement could be strengthened by granting existing enforcement
agencies increased powers and supplemented by increased centrali-
zation and organization. An international force, such as an Inter-
national Drug Enforcement Administration could be established.
Such a body would be useful for the organization of information
(including intelligence) and supervision of existing agencies com-
batting the illicit industry. Enactment and enforcement of severe
penalties for engaging in any aspect of illicit production or traffick-
ing would be required by the signatories. The penalties would be
expressly agreed upon in the treaty in order to avoid existing
problems concerning different philosophies of criminal law.2°4 In-
creased emphasis on enforcement and the imposition of severe pen-
alties would create an effective deterrent to participation in illicit
narcotics activities. The present system contains virtually no means
to inhibit the illicit drug industry,20 5 and it is crucial that the new
system contain effective measures. 206
Finally, the treaty must be directed squarely at the illicit drug
industry, as the legal aspects of the narcotics industry have been
effectively controlled by the present system.2 °7 This goal can be
accomplished by incorporating the above proposals which would:
202. See supra notes 176-178 and accompanying text.
203. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL STRATEGY 2 (1981);
see also N.Y. Times, Jan. 25, 1982, at 5, col. 1, noting that there are continuing bloody
clashes between the drug armies and Thai border police.
204. Signatories can also be encouraged to develop legislation designed to expose the
laundering of illicit money. For instance, the signatories would be required to fully cooper-
ate in the development of an information network between the banks and the enforcement
agencies.
205. See supra notes 172-175.
206. If the system provides an adequate deterrence, the illicit producer and trafficker will
finally have something to discourage his practice. This is an essential framework with which
to begin the assault on the illicit industry.
207. See supra note 158.
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(1) establish educational treatment centers, (2) provide for adequate
funding, (3) eliminate escape clauses and denunciation provisions,
(4) change the focus of the attack from crop control to a viable
alternative, and (5) establish a concrete enforcement system which
would provide an effective deterrent to illicit producers and traf-
fickers. By incorporating these provisions into a multilateral treaty,
the foundation for eradication of this international menace would
be established.
V. CONCLUSION
This Comment's examination of the scope of the international
narcotics problem has made it readily apparent that the problem
has reached epidemic proportions. A survey of the history of inter-
national narcotics control has illustrated that as the problem inten-
sified the international community responded legally with the
enactment of multilateral treaties. The present system that has
evolved to provide narcotics control has brought with it the inade-
quacies of the previous systems, and is fatally weak in several re-
spects. This Comment has demonstrated that the international
community is prepared to unify to solve the problem. Prevention
of illegal drug trafficking can be accomplished by eliminating the
weaknesses which exist in the present treaties.
This Comment has proposed that stringent measures be en-
acted to remove the weaknesses associated with past and present
treaties. The proposed system could be a demanding one for the
international community, as it calls for affirmative action and does
not leave its prospects for success in the hands of individual coun-
tries. Moreover, the nature and urgency of the current interna-
tional narcotics problem dictates that these measures should be
undertaken before the illicit drug industry becomes more powerful
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